[Footnote AH: I cannot enter upon a discussion of the latest psychological problems, here involved, partly because that would take us beyond the purpose of this monograph, and partly because they are still moot questions and hence not suited to popular treatment. Briefly though, they are these: What is the nature of the relationship between cognitive and affective states on the one hand and involuntary, (so-called expressive) movements on the other? Is this connection an external thing, as it were, an association arising as a habit formation, or does every idea partake essentially of a motor character? Do purely cognitive states give rise to such movements, or does the movement impulse depend more particularly upon the affective consciousness accompanying the cognitive states? And in how far do given kinds of expressive movements depend upon certain ideational types (c.f. page 95)? Thus, what is the influence of the visual image upon the gestures for "up," "down," etc.? And then, are these involuntary movements, when not noted, truly unconscious, or merely not attended to,----in other words, are they beyond the pale of consciousness or merely "at the fringe?" The various writers speak almost without exception of unconscious movements in the strict sense of the term. My own introspections, however, have led me to doubt whether they are quite unconscious. Since I have attained some practice I am able to describe in detail (under conditions of objective control) my involuntary movements, no matter how slight, even down to mere muscular tensions. None of my subjects, however, has as yet succeeded in this. It is no very easy matter to be on the lookout for some unknown movements which might eventually occur, while attempting to concentrate attention to the utmost upon a certain definite ideational content, for this very dividing of attention effects a decrease in the force of the movement, and thus makes it all the more difficult to discover. From my own experience, however, I am inclined to believe that these movements are not unconscious, but merely unattended to, in other words, we have a narrowing down of the apperceived content within certain limits, but not a narrowing down of consciousness, (much less a "splitting" of consciousness or of personality as the thing unfortunately has sometimes been called). In order, however, not to be guilty of premature judgment, I have avoided the terms "unconscious" and "unattended to," and chose expressions which leave these finer distinctions untouched.]