Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo JimaAlexander, Joseph H.
History
Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima
Alexander, Joseph H.
Iwo Jima, Battle of, Japan, 1945; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- World War, 1939-1945
The American drive north continued after the 5 March standdown, but the
going never got any easier. The nature of enemy fire changed--fewer big
guns and rockets, less observed fire from the highlands--but now the
terrain grew uglier, deteriorating into narrow, twisted gorges wreathed
in sulfur mists, lethal killing zones. Marine casualties continued to
mount, but gunshot wounds began to outnumber high-explosive shrapnel
hits. The persistent myth among some Marine units that Japanese troops
were all near-sighted and hence poor marksmen ended for good at Iwo
Jima. In the close-quarters fighting among the badlands of northern
Iwo Jima, Japanese riflemen dropped hundreds of advancing Marines with
well-aimed shots to the head or chest. “Poor marksmen?” snorted Captain
Caldwell of Company F, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, “The Japs we faced
all fired ‘Expert.’”
[Illustration: _Mopping up the caves with grenades and Browning
automatic rifles, Marines flush out remaining Japanese hidden in Iwo
Jima’s numerous and interconnecting caves._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142472
]
Supporting arms coordination grew more effective during the battle.
Colonel “Buzz” Letcher established what some have identified as the
first corps-level Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC), in which
senior representatives of artillery, naval gunfire, and air support
pooled their talents and resources. While Letcher lacked the manpower
and communications equipment to serve as corps artillery officer and
simultaneously run a full-time SACC, his efforts represented a major
advancement in this difficult art. So did Colonel Vernon Megee’s
Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, which worked in relative
harmony with the fledgling SACC. Instances of friendly fire still
occurred, perhaps inevitably on that crowded island, but positive
control at the highest level did much to reduce the frequency of such
accidents. In terms of response time, multiple-source coordination
probably worked better at the division level and below. Most infantry
battalions, for example, had nothing but praise for the Air Liaison
Parties, Shore Fire Control Parties, and artillery forward observer
teams which deployed with each maneuver unit.
[Illustration:
Marine Corps Combat Art Collection
_“The Target,” by Col Charles H. Waterhouse._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account