Monarchy -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800; United States -- Politics and government -- 1775-1783
In point of manning a fleet, people in general run into great errors;
it is not necessary that one fourth part should be sailors. The
Terrible privateer, Captain Death, stood the hottest engagement of
any ship last war, yet had not twenty sailors on board, though her
complement of men was upwards of two hundred. A few able and social
sailors will soon instruct a sufficient number of active landmen in
the common work of a ship. Wherefore, we never can be more capable
to begin on maritime matters than now, while our timber is standing,
our fisheries blocked up, and our sailors and shipwrights out of
employ. Men of war, of seventy and eighty guns were built forty
years ago in New-England, and why not the same now? Ship-building is
America's greatest pride, and in which, she will in time excel the
whole world. The great empires of the east are mostly inland, and
consequently excluded from the possibility of rivalling her. Africa
is in a state of barbarism; and no power in Europe, hath either such
an extent of coast, or such an internal supply of materials. Where
nature hath given the one, she has withheld the other; to America
only hath she been liberal of both. The vast empire of Russia is
almost shut out from the sea; wherefore, her boundless forests, her
tar, iron, and cordage are only articles of commerce.
In point of safety, ought we to be without a fleet? We are not the
little people now, which we were sixty years ago; at that time we
might have trusted our property in the streets, or fields rather;
and slept securely without locks or bolts to our doors or windows.
The case now is altered, and our methods of defence, ought to
improve with our increase of property. A common pirate, twelve
months ago, might have come up the Delaware, and laid the city of
Philadelphia under instant contribution, for what sum he pleased;
and the same might have happened to other places. Nay, any daring
fellow, in a brig of fourteen or sixteen guns, might have robbed the
whole Continent, and carried off half a million of money. These are
circumstances which demand our attention, and point out the
necessity of naval protection.
Some, perhaps, will say, that after we have made it up with Britain,
she will protect us. Can we be so unwise as to mean, that she shall
keep a navy in our harbours for that purpose? Common sense will tell
us, that the power which hath endeavoured to subdue us, is of all
others, the most improper to defend us. Conquest may be effected
under the pretence of friendship; and ourselves, after a long and
brave resistance, be at last cheated into slavery. And if her ships
are not to be admitted into our harbours, I would ask, how is she to
protect us? A navy three or four thousand miles off can be of little
use, and on sudden emergencies, none at all. Wherefore, if we must
hereafter protect ourselves, why not do it for ourselves? Why do it
for another?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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