Monarchy; Political science; United States -- Politics and government -- 1775-1783
But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increase
likewise, and the distance at which the members may be separated,
will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every
occasion as at first, when their number was small, their habitations
near, and the public concerns few and trifling. This will point out
the convenience of their consenting to leave the legislative part to
be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are
supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who
appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body
would act were they present. If the colony continues increasing, it
will become necessary to augment the number of the representatives,
and that the interest of every part of the colony may be attended to,
it will be found best to divide the whole into convenient parts, each
part sending its proper number; and that the ELECTED might never
form to themselves an interest separate from the ELECTORS, prudence
will point out the propriety of having elections often; because as
the ELECTED might by that means return and mix again with the
general body of the ELECTORS in a few months, their fidelity to the
public will be secured by the prudent reflexion of not making a rod
for themselves. And as this frequent interchange will establish a
common interest with every part of the community, they will mutually
and naturally support each other, and on this (not on the unmeaning
name of king) depends the STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE HAPPINESS
OF THE GOVERNED.
Here then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode
rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the
world; here too is the design and end of government, viz. freedom and
security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with snow, or our ears
deceived by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or interest
darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature and of reason
will say, it is right.
I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in
nature, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any
thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier
repaired when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few
remarks on the so much boasted constitution of England. That it was
noble for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected, is
granted. When the world was over run with tyranny the least remove
therefrom was a glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to
convulsions, and incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is
easily demonstrated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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