The next inquiry relates to the causes which regulate the _power_ of generic volition. Among those causes, the most prominent is that natural force of will which is strictly constitutional. Some minds are formed by the Creator with great energy and great pertinacity of will, so that when a purpose is formed, all subordinate volitions needful to carry out this purpose seem easily controlled. Other minds, on the contrary, possess a naturally feeble will, so that no generic volition has a strong and steady control, but is constantly interrupted in its power over subordinate volitions, or is easily changed by conflicting desires. In one case the person is denominated a man of firm purpose or a man of a strong will. In the other case he is called a man of yielding temperament or a weak character. The remaining causes that give strength to a generic purpose are most of those that have been enumerated as causes of the _direction_ of volition, or _deciding causes_. These are the constitutional susceptibilities--the habits--the surrounding circumstances--the existence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example. In all this variety of influences that decide those generic volitions which are the foundation of moral character, it must be remembered that in every case the mind has the power to choose that which the judgment decides to be the greatest good on the whole for itself and for the commonwealth. _How one Mind causes Volitions in another Mind._ In this connection, it is important to secure exact ideas of what is meant when one mind is spoken of as _the cause_ of the volitions of another mind. Of course, in this relation, no mind can be the _producing_ cause of volition in any mind but itself. It must be, then, either as _occasional_ or as _deciding_ causes that we can influence other minds. The only mode by which we can regulate the volitions of other minds is by _the employment of motives to stimulate desire, or by changing the constitutional susceptibilities_. In the first case, men have power to so combine circumstances of temptation as to affect the most excitable and powerful sensibilities, or they can remove those objects and influences that sustain moral principle, or by a long course of training they can form habits and induce principles. The combinations of motive influences that one mind can bring to bear on another, as temptations to right or wrong action, are almost infinite.