Another deciding cause of volition is the nature of the _constitutional susceptibilities_. For example, when it is asked why did a man forsake domestic life and become a soldier, the deciding cause may be that he had a strong constitutional love of the excitement and glory connected with that profession, and but little susceptibility for the quiet enjoyments of domestic life. It is sometimes the case that a child, from its birth, seems to possess a natural love for truth, so that instructions on that point are scarcely needed. In another case, in the same family, and under exactly the same training, will be found a child who has the contrary propensity, so that it costs years of careful training to form a principle of veracity. The same constitutional variety will be found in reference to other virtues. Another deciding cause of volition are _the habits_. The existence of a _habit of obedience_, for example, will induce the formation of virtuous purposes that would never have existed but for this. A child who began life with strong propensities to certain faults, by a wise and careful training may secure habits that are fully equal in power to the same constitutional traits in another child. Often, in the result, it can not be seen whether the generic purpose to be truthful, for example, resulted mainly from natural constitution or from the formation of habits. The will itself also is more or less regulated by this principle. When a child is trained constantly to submit to fixed rules, the will acquires increased ease and facility in doing it. On the contrary, a mind that is never controlled grows more and more averse to yielding to any regulating principle. Another deciding cause of volition is such _a combination of circumstances_ as excites one class of desires, while other sensibilities have no appropriate objects to stimulate them. For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to drink and gamble? The cause assigned may be the presence of liquor and of tempting companions, and the want of objects to excite higher susceptibilities. He had no wise friends, no business, and no higher sources of enjoyment immediately around him. Another deciding cause of volition is the existence of _principle or generic purpose_. For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to give up his liberty and property when he could have secured them by false testimony? The answer may be that he was a truthful man or a virtuous man--that is, he had formed a strong generic purpose to speak the truth or to act right on all occasions. Another deciding cause of volition is the existence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example. This is the most powerful of all the influences which secure and sustain generic volitions, as will be illustrated more at large in future pages. _Causes that regulate the Power of Generic Volitions._