As an example of this, the emotion of pleasure has been so often connected with the clear blue of the sky and with the bright verdure of the foliage, that the sight of either of these colors recalls the emotions, though we may not be able to refer to any particular time when this previous connection existed. In like manner, the moaning sound of the wind in a storm, or the harsh growl which sometimes attends it, has so often been united with sorrowful or disagreeable emotions, that the sounds recall the emotions. But there is another important fact in regard to the causes of the emotions of taste. It is found that the character of the _combination_ of sounds, forms, colors, and motions has as much to do with the existence of such feelings as the nature of these objects of perception. The very same colors and forms, in certain combination, are very displeasing, when in others they are beautiful. Thus, also, certain motions in certain circumstances are very beautiful or sublime, and in others very displeasing. The very same sounds, also, may be made either very disagreeable or very delightful, according to their combination. To account for this, it is necessary to understand that objects which tend to awaken emotions of a directly opposite nature can not both operate on the mind without causing disagreeable feelings. If we are surrounded by objects of awe and solemnity, it is painful to notice objects that are mean or ludicrous. If we are under the influence of sprightly and humorous feelings, it is painful to encounter solemn and pensive scenes, with which, perhaps, at other times, we should be pleased. In order, therefore, to awaken emotions of beauty and sublimity, there must exist a _congruity_ in the arrangement and composition of parts which will prevent the operation of causes that would awaken incongruous emotions. But there is another principle which has a still more powerful operation in regard to the effect of combination and composition. We are always accustomed to view objects with some reference to their _nature_ and _use_. We always feel that every effect must have a cause, and that every contrivance has some _design_ which it was made to accomplish. There is no intellectual attribute of mind which is regarded with more admiration than _wisdom_, which is always shown in selecting the best means for accomplishing a given end; and the more interesting or important is the object to be secured, the more is the mind pleased with discovering the wisdom exhibited in adapting means to secure this end. Almost every construction of nature or of art is regarded by the mind as having some use and design. No mind, except one bereft of its powers, would ever employ itself in designing any thing which has no possible use, either in benefiting or pleasing the designer or others; and should any such object be found, it would cause only disgust, as exhibiting the fatuity of a mind which spent its powers in contriving so useless a thing.