Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the PeopleBeecher, Catharine Esther
Religion
Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People
Beecher, Catharine Esther
Religion -- Philosophy
In other cases, this quiet, hidden, but controlling purpose seems to be
formed by unconscious and imperceptible influences, so that the mind can
not revert to the specific time or manner when it originated. For
example, a child who is trained from early life to speak the truth, can
never revert to any particular moment when this generic purpose
originated.
It is sometimes the case, also, that a person will contemplate some
generic volition before it occurs, while the process of its final
formation seems almost beyond the power of scrutiny. For example, a man
may be urged to relinquish one employment and engage in another. He
reflects, consults, and is entirely uncertain how he shall decide. As
time passes, he gradually inclines toward the proposed change, until,
finally, he finds his determination fixed, he scarcely knows when or
how.
Thus it appears that generic volitions commence sometimes so
instantaneously and obviously that the time and influences connected
with them can be recognized. In other cases, the decision seems to be a
gradual one, while in some instances the process can be traced, and in
others it is entirely unnoticed or forgotten.
It is in reference to such generic purposes that the _moral character_
of men is estimated. An honest man is one who has a fixed purpose to act
honestly in all circumstances. A truthful man is one who has such a
purpose to speak the truth at all times.
In such cases, the degree in which such a purpose controls all others is
the measure of a man's moral character in the estimate of society.
The history of mankind shows a great diversity of moral character
dependent on such generic volitions. Some men possess firm and reliable
moral principles in certain directions, while they are very destitute of
them in others.
Thus it will be seen that some have formed a very decided purpose in
regard to honesty in business affairs, who yet are miserable victims to
intemperance. Others have cultivated a principle called _honor_, that
restrains them from certain actions regarded as mean, and yet they may
be frequenters of gambling saloons and other haunts of vice.
In the religious world, too, it is the case that some who are very firm
and decided on all points of religious observances and in the
cultivation of devotional emotions, are guilty of very mean actions,
such as some worldly men of honor would not practice at the sacrifice of
a right hand.
_On Causes of Volition._
It becomes, then, a most interesting subject of inquiry as to the
_causes_ which decide these diversities of moral purposes, and also the
causes which operate to give them more or less control over other
principles.
But, preliminary to this, it is necessary to secure some discriminating
accuracy in regard to the signification of the word _cause_ in its
various uses.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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