This term, in its widest sense, signifies "_that without which a change will not take place, and with which it will take place_." This is the leading idea which is included in every use of the word. But there is a foundation for three classes of causes which may be denominated _producing causes, occasional causes_, and _deciding causes_. A _producing cause_ is that which produces a change by the constitution of nature, so that in the given circumstances there is no power to do otherwise. _Occasional causes_ are those circumstances which are indispensable to the action of producing causes. Thus, when fire is applied to your powder, the fire is the producing cause of the explosion, while the act of contact between the fire and powder is the occasional cause. In regard to the action of mind in volition, the mind itself is the producing cause, while excited desires and objects to excite those desires are the occasional causes. Or, in other words, mind is the producing cause of its own volitions, and motives are the occasional causes. _On Deciding Causes of Volition._ But inasmuch as mind always has the power to choose in _either_ of two or more directions, the question arises as to _the causes which decide the direction of volitions_, and which may be called _deciding causes_. Whenever it is asked, "_Why_ did a person choose to do thus?" the meaning is, What were the causes that influenced him to decide thus? Now these causes are ascertained, as all others are, by experience. Men are always stating to each other, as well as noticing in their own experience, the causes which decide their determinations. First, in certain cases, where two or more objects are presented, of which only one can be taken, the cause assigned for the direction of the choice may be that _one excited a stronger desire than the other_. A vast proportion of human volitions are decided simply by the fact that one object seems a greater good or excites a stronger desire than any other, and is thus the strongest motive. But there are other cases where, of the objects presented, one excites the strongest desire, while the judgment perceives that another will secure a _greater good on the whole_. For example, in case of a sick person, there may be placed a favorite drink that excites a very strong desire, and beside it may stand a nauseous medicine. In this case, the invalid may feel the strongest desire for the drink, and yet choose the medicine as the greater good in its final results. In such cases, what decides the direction of a volition is the judgment of the mind, that the object chosen, though it does not excite the strongest desire, is still the greater good.