In 1825 that eminent jurist, Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania, in a dissenting opinion in _Eakin_ v. _Raub_, 12 _S. & R._ 330, insisted in an able, elaborate, and exhaustive argument that while the judiciary was bound to refuse effect to a state statute in conflict with the Federal Constitution, it was bound to give it effect if repugnant only to the state constitution. He frankly admitted the logical conclusion that in such case the only remedy the citizen had to enforce his constitutional rights was that of revolution. When, however, his opinion in _Eakin_ v. _Raub_ was cited in 1845 in argument in _Norris_ v. _Clymer_, 2 _Pa. St._ 277, he said he had changed his opinion on that question, partly "from experience of the necessity of the case." In the later case, _De Chastellux_ v. _Fairchild_, 15 _Pa. St._ 18, he was emphatic in his declaration of the power and duty of the court to refuse effect to a state statute in conflict with the state constitution. In delivering the opinion of the court he used this vigorous language: "It is idle to say the authority of each branch (of the government) is defined and limited in the constitution, if there be not an independent power able and willing to enforce the limitations.... From its very position it is apparent that the conservative power is lodged with the judiciary, which in the exercise of its undoubted right is bound to meet every emergency." The results of the contrary doctrine are well stated by the same court in _Perkins_ v. _Philadelphia_, 156 _Pa. St._ 554. "If laws in conflict with the constitution be passed by the legislature, approved by the governor and sustained by the court, that is revolution. It is no less revolution because accomplished without great violence. It matters little to the house owner whether the structure built to shelter him be blown up by dynamite, or the foundation be pried out stone by stone with a crowbar. In either case he is houseless."