Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit and Some Miscellaneous PiecesColeridge, Samuel Taylor
Religion
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit and Some Miscellaneous Pieces
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor
Bible -- Inspiration
rule, render all collation and cross-examination of written records
ineffective, and obliterate the main character by which authentic
histories are distinguished from those traditional tales, which each
successive reporter enlarges and fashions to his own fancy and purpose,
and every different edition of which more or less contradicts the other?
Allow me to create chasms _ad libitum_, and _ad libitum_ to fill them up
with imagined facts and incidents, and I would almost undertake to
harmonise Falstaff’s account of the rogues in buckram into a coherent and
consistent narrative. What, I say, could have tempted grave and pious
men thus to disturb the foundation of the Temple, in order to repair a
petty breach or rat-hole in the wall, or fasten a loose stone or two in
the outer court, if not an assumed necessity arising out of the peculiar
character of Bible history?
The substance of the syllogism, by which their procedure was justified to
their own minds, can be no other than this. That, without which two
assertions—both of which _must_ be alike true and correct—would
contradict each other, and consequently be, one or both, false or
incorrect, must itself be true. But every word and syllable existing in
the original text of the Canonical Books, from the _Cherethi_ and
_Phelethi_ of David to the name in the copy of a family register, the
site of a town, or the course of a river, were dictated to the sacred
_amanuensis_ by an infallible intelligence. Here there can be neither
more nor less. Important or unimportant gives no ground of difference;
and the number of the writers as little. The secretaries may have been
many—the historian was one and the same, and he infallible. This is the
_minor_ of the syllogism, and if it could be proved, the conclusion would
be at least plausible; and there would be but one objection to the
procedure, namely, its uselessness. For if it had been proved already,
what need of proving it over again, and by means—the removal, namely, of
apparent contradictions—which the infallible Author did not think good to
employ? But if it have not been proved, what becomes of the argument
which derives its whole force and legitimacy from the assumption?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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