Soon, however, experience comes into play. We learn that there are other impulses beside the dictates of conscience, that there are powers within us and without us ready to usurp the throne of conscience, and busy in tempting us to transfer our allegiance. We learn that there are many things contrary to conscience, and therefore to be rejected and utterly excluded, and many that can coexist with its supremacy only by being subjugated as beasts of burthen; and others again, as for instance the social tendernesses and affections, and the faculties and excitations of the intellect, which must be at least subordinated. The preservation of our loyalty and fealty under these trials, and against these rivals, constitutes the second sense of faith; and we shall need but one more point of view to complete its full import. This is the consideration of what is presupposed in the human conscience. The answer is ready. As in the equation of the correlative I and Thou, one of the twin constituents is to be taken as _plus_ will, the other as _minus_ will, so is it here; and it is obvious that the reason or _super_-individual of each man, whereby he is a man, is the factor we are to take as _minus_ will, and that the individual will or personalising principle of free agency (“arbitrement” is Milton’s word) is the factor marked _plus_ will; and again, that as the identity or co-inherence of the absolute will and the reason, is the peculiar character of God, so is the _synthesis_ of the individual will and the common reason, by the subordination of the former to the latter, the only possible likeness or image of the _prothesis_ or identity, and therefore the required proper character of man. Conscience, then, is a witness respecting the identity of the will and the reason, effected by the self-subordination of the will or self to the reason, as equal to or representing the will of God. But the personal will is a factor in other moral _synthesis_, for example, appetite _plus_ personal will = sensuality; lust of power, _plus_ personal will = ambition, and so on, equally as in the _synthesis_ on which the conscience is grounded. Not this, therefore, but the other _synthesis_, must supply the specific character of the conscience, and we must enter into an analysis of reason. Such as the nature and objects of the reason are, such must be the functions and objects of the conscience. And the former we shall best learn by recapitulating those constituents of the total man which are either contrary to or disparate from the reason. I. Reason, and the proper objects of reason, are wholly alien from sensation. Reason is supersensual, and its antagonist is appetite, and the objects of appetite the lust of the flesh. II. Reason and its objects do not appertain to the world of the senses, inward or outward; that is, they partake not of sense or fancy. Reason is supersensuous, and here its antagonist is the lust of the eye.