As regards the purely internal sanction of our actions and thoughts, that is to say, our relationship with Ultimate Reality, which is God or the Law of Existence, there is only one conception of the latter which seems to comprehend the infinite with the finite, and that is Force, because it is the continuity of Existence, or after the manner of Leibnitz: "Substance, the ultimate reality, can only be conceived as force." Any moral law which may be said to be fundamental in itself and independent of circumstances will be in relation to force. But such "laws" will also be independent of the moral imperatives and written codes, for they are independent of volition--of the will to obey them. Can a man be possessed of love, greatness, nobility, courage, honour, at a word of command? Therefore if it can be truly said that "love is the greatest thing in the world," it is because it is the most powerful force. Hate is disruptive, disintegrating and annihilating; love is integrating and strengthening. But there is yet one "good," one fundamental imperative which needs no proof, and that is Truth--ultimate truth, because it is the statement of what Is; without which logic, or, indeed, intelligible language, would be impossible. But truth is not opinion, or assertion, or hope, or faith, or in the words of Huxley "those idols built up of books and traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs." Truth and all its derivatives--honesty, integrity, truthfulness and sincerity--have an intrinsic value of their own, for their negation implies the negation of the principles of Existence. But men require more than this, they require a "moral code" or standard to give coherence to their relationships; this code, then, is that which is desired, or imposed, and this want is most efficiently supplied by the principle of "Utility." FOOTNOTES: [13] See "Conscience, its Origin and Authority," p. 25. [14] W. H. Mallock, quoted by Richardson. [15] Professor James Ward uses the terms "anabolic" and "catabolic" processes in this connexion, also in a sense analogous to the distinction between doing and suffering. [16] J. Ward, "Heredity and Memory," 1913. [17] "Conscience, its Origin and Authority," p. 69. [18] _Ibid._, pp. 67 and 68. [19] "Conscience, its Origin and Authority," p. 96. [20] Hastings Rashdall: "Is Conscience an Emotion?" [21] "Conscience, its Origin and Authority," p. 99. [22] "Conscience, its Origin and Authority," pp. 99, 95, 96, 70, 72 and 73. [23] "Is Conscience an Emotion?" p. 113. [24] "Is Conscience an Emotion?" p. 52. III THE MEANING OF MORAL OBLIGATION