Considerations on Representative GovernmentMill, John Stuart
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Considerations on Representative Government
Mill, John Stuart
Representative government and representation
three; and to secure, by fixed rules and complete publicity, the
honest application of so very simple a test. This condition,
therefore, should in all cases accompany universal suffrage; and it
would, after a few years, exclude none but those who cared so little
for the privilege, that their vote, if given, would not in general be
an indication of any real political opinion.
It is also important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either
general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay
something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing
by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish
and none to economize. As far as money matters are concerned, any
power of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental
principle of free government, a severance of the power of control from
the interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts to allowing them
to put their hands into other people's pockets for any purpose which
they think fit to call a public one, which, in the great towns of the
United States, is known to have produced a scale of local taxation
onerous beyond example, and wholly borne by the wealthier classes.
That representation should be coextensive with taxation, not stopping
short of it, but also not going beyond it, is in accordance with the
theory of British institutions. But to reconcile this, as a condition
annexed to the representation, with universality, it is essential, as
it is on many other accounts desirable, that taxation, in a visible
shape, should descend to the poorest class. In this country, and in
most others, there is probably no laboring family which does not
contribute to the indirect taxes, by the purchase of tea, coffee,
sugar, not to mention narcotics or stimulants. But this mode of
defraying a share of the public expenses is hardly felt: the payer,
unless a person of education and reflection, does not identify his
interest with a low scale of public expenditure as closely as when
money for its support is demanded directly from himself; and even
supposing him to do so, he would doubtless take care that, however
lavish an expenditure he might, by his vote, assist in imposing upon
the government, it should not be defrayed by any additional taxes on
the articles which he himself consumes. It would be better that a
direct tax, in the simple form of a capitation, should be levied on
every grown person in the community; or that every such person should
be admitted an elector on allowing himself to be rated _extra ordinem_
to the assessed taxes; or that a small annual payment, rising and
falling with the gross expenditure of the country, should be required
from every registered elector, that so every one might feel that the
money which he assisted in voting was partly his own, and that he was
interested in keeping down its amount.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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