The great Mr. Locke says[14], that reason is supposed to make the characteristic difference between man and beasts: but, what is the characteristic that distinguishes man from man? That there may and should be such a distinction, I have already endeavoured to shew; and I am apt to think that this is a question not without its answer. The learned Dr. Hutchinson[15] has demonstrated the existence of _a moral sense_ in, and peculiar to, human nature; which as it serves essentially to distinguish man from beasts, and to raise him from the tenth to the ten thousandth link of the chain, so is it, in my humble apprehension, an evident criterion of the specific difference between man and man. Now Mr. Locke, speaking of reason as that faculty whereby man is distinguished from beasts, says, that beasts have reason in common with men; in which however he is to be understood, that beasts possess the faculty, and in some measure have the use, of reason; but man’s superiority over beasts consists in the power of exerting that faculty, and in the compound ratio of its exertion. As beasts therefore have the faculty of reason, and it is the exertion in degree of that faculty (particularly in obtaining abstract ideas) that creates the great difference between man and beasts: so by the same parity of reasoning, the _moral sense_ being a faculty of the human mind common to all men, the capacity of perceiving moral relations, the power of exercising that faculty, and the compound ratio of its exercise, is that which makes the grand difference and distinction between man and man. All nature, my Lord, which is the art of God, is wisely fitted and adapted to that use and purpose for which it was ordained; and the same observation is to be made even in the art of man. A flea is not less perfect than an elephant because of its size: neither is the cup that holds a pint less compleat than the vessel that contains an hundred gallons; when both are full, the end for which both were designed is answered and fulfilled. The use then to be made of this doctrine, my Lord, is, that as experience, observation, and experiment, are the foundations upon which all speculative philosophy is raised; so, from experience and observation, I judge that the truth of this hypothesis may be very clearly proved and demonstrated. Now, in order to this, it is necessary to have recourse to the histories of nations: to read, to examine, and compare them, one with the other. To observe the moral improvements had by them, to remark the social virtues that prevail; and this will bring me to the accounts that have been given of Negroes (for histories they have none of their own) and consequently back to the subject of this address to your Lordship. But, my Lord, forbearing to trouble your Lordship with a detail of these accounts, I shall, referring them to your Lordship’s memory, content myself with the bare mention of a few facts only[16].