Being, both by birth and fortune, connected with one of the Islands in America, I was led, somewhat interestedly as your Lordship may suppose, to attend to the arguments that were lately offered in the Court of King’s Bench, in the Case of Somerset the Negroe _versus_ Knowles and others. It was a new case, said to be full of concern to America; and it had engrossed much of general expectation. My object therefore was that of information: but, without meaning to lessen the labours, or depreciate the merits of the learned counsel concerned therein, I must confess, that the lights thrown on the case did by no means appear to me as, on either side, decisive of the point in question[1]. It is true that a vast and extensive variety of reading was shewn and discovered: the profoundest depths of learning and science were fathomed and explored: lawgivers, philosophers, civilians, from all historic existence, were brought to light and examined: the examples, definitions, and opinions, which Moses, Aristotle, Justinian, Grotius, Pufendorff, and the rest, had given of slavery, were cited, explained, and enlarged upon: the edicts and regulations of French, Spanish, German, Flemish, and Dutch police on this head were mentioned and produced. But, my Lord, with all due deference and submission, may I ask, how applicable was this antiquated and foreign doctrine to the case then under your Lordship’s contemplation? The politics of Aristotle are not the rules of the Court of King’s Bench; _neither is Roman jurisprudence the law of that court_. As a display of general knowledge, it had with me, as it must have had with every one present, its great abundance of merit and commendation; and I had followed the learned gentlemen, with the highest pleasure, in their travels and pursuits abroad in search of matter of illustration, if the case had been brought home with them at last, and rested on its own _native_ ground and foundation. But herein, my Lord, I found myself unsatisfied and disappointed: for how the question remained with your Lordship as a point of law for the judgment of the Court, I own, I was unable to comprehend, or to learn. It is therefore, my Lord, that I now take the liberty to offer the following Considerations to your Lordship’s notice and observance; trusting to the importance of the subject, and to your wonted candour, for my apology and pardon in the attempt.