Constitutional History of England, Henry VII to George II. Volume 3 of 3Hallam, Henry
History
Constitutional History of England, Henry VII to George II. Volume 3 of 3
Hallam, Henry
Constitutional history -- Great Britain
permitted to express a hope that the necessary dissolution of
parliament within six months of a demise of the Crown will not long be
thought congenial to the spirit of our modern government.
_Peerage bill._--A far more unanimous sentence has been pronounced by
posterity upon another great constitutional question, that arose under
George I. Lord Sunderland persuaded the king to renounce his important
prerogative of making peers; and a bill was supported by the ministry,
limiting the House of Lords, after the creation of a very few more, to
its actual numbers. The Scots were to have twenty-five hereditary,
instead of sixteen elective, members of the house; a provision neither
easily reconciled to the union, nor required by the general tenor of
the bill. This measure was carried with no difficulty through the
upper house, whose interests were so manifestly concerned in it. But
a similar motive, concurring with the efforts of a powerful malcontent
party, caused its rejection by the Commons.[344] It was justly thought
a proof of the king's ignorance or indifference in everything that
concerned his English Crown, that he should have consented to so
momentous a sacrifice; and Sunderland was reproached for so audacious
an endeavour to strengthen his private faction at the expense of the
fundamental laws of the monarchy. Those who maintained the expediency
of limiting the peerage, had recourse to uncertain theories as to the
ancient constitution, and denied this prerogative to have been
originally vested in the Crown. A more plausible argument was derived
from the abuse, as it was then generally accounted, of creating at
once twelve peers in the late reign, for the sole end of establishing
a majority for the court; a resource which would be always at the
command of successive factions, till the British nobility might become
as numerous and venal as that of some European states. It was argued
that there was a fallacy in concluding the collective power of the
House of Lords to be augmented by its limitation, because every single
peer would evidently become of more weight in the kingdom; that the
wealth of the whole body must bear a less proportion to that of the
nation, and would possibly not exceed that of the lower house, while
on the other hand it might be indefinitely multiplied by fresh
creations; that the Crown would lose one great engine of corrupt
influence over the Commons, which could never be truly independent,
while its principal members were looking on it as a stepping-stone to
hereditary honours.[345]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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