Providence, considered in reference to all things existing, is termed by Knapp universal; in reference to moral beings, special; and in reference to holy or converted beings, particular. Every thing is an object of Providence in proportion to its capacity. The Disciples, being of more value than many sparrows, were assured of greater providential care. By Providence being universal is intended, not merely that it embraces classes of objects or greater matters, but that nothing is too minute or insignificant for its inspection. Providence is usually divided in three divine acts, Preservation, Co-operation and Government. 1. By preservation is signified the causing of existence to continue. 2. Co-operation is the act of God which causes the powers of created things to remain in being. It is not pretended that the existence of the powers of the things are ever separated, but only that they are distinguishable in mental analysis. Co-operation varies with the nature of the objects towards which it is exercised. 3. Government, as a branch of Providence, is God's controlling all created things so as to promote the highest good of the whole. To this end every species of being is acted upon in a way confirmable to its nature; for instance, inanimate things by the laws of physical influence; brutes according to the laws of instinct; and free agents according to the laws of free agency. Moreover, as Providence has respect to the nature which God has been pleased to design to each various object, so, in common with every other divine act, it is characterized by divine perfections. It displays omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, holiness, justice, and benevolence. It has been sometimes contended that Providence does not extend to all things, or to unimportant events, and chiefly for four reasons. Such an all-embracing providence, it is said, would (1) be distracting to the mind of God; or (2) would be beneath His dignity; or (3) would interfere with human freedom; or (4) would render God unjust in permitting evil to exist. In reply to these objections against a providence controlling all things without exception, it may be observed that the third and fourth suggest difficulties which press equally, in fact, upon all hypothesis, not only as to providence, but as to creation, and which shall be more fully explained in the sequel.