2. Mechanism. Many, alarmed at the consequences which occasionalism would seem to involve, have embraced an opposite scheme. They criticise the definition of the laws of nature, and contend that occasionalism derives all its plausibility from adroitly availing itself of the ambiguities of language. They would have us view the creation as a species of clock, or other machinery, which, being once made and wound up, will for a time perform its movements without the assistance or even presence of its maker. But reasons press too far the analogy between the Creator and an artisan. So excellent a man as Baxter was misled by this hypothesis, which evidently is as derogatory to God as occasionalism is fatal to the moral agency of man. 3. The authors of the third scheme respecting the mode in which Providence permits sin sought to be "Eclectics" or to find a path intermediate between Mechanism and Occasionalism. In their judgment, man is actuated by God, and yet is at the same time active himself. God gives man the power of action, and preserves these powers every moment, but he is not the efficient cause of free actions themselves. This they say, is involved in the very idea of a moral being, which would cease to be moral if it were subjected to the control of necessity, and not suffered to choose and to do what it saw to be the best according to the laws of freedom. But it is asked, why did God create men free, and therefore fallible? It were presumption to think of answering this question adequately. It belongs to the deep things of God. But, among the possible reasons, we may mention, that if no fallible beings had been created, there could have been no virtue in the universe; for virtue implies probation, and probation a liability to temptation and sin. Again, if some beings had not become sinful, the most glorious attributes of God would never have been so fully exerted and displayed. How could His wisdom and mercy and grace have been adequately manifested, except by suffering a portion of His creatures to become such as to demand the exercise of those attributes? How else could He have wrought the miracle of educing good from evil? In this connection we may allude to the third chapter of Romans, where as in other passages, it is declared, that the good which evil may be over-ruled to produce, cannot palliate, much less excuse, the guilt of sinners, or of those who say, "Let us do evil that good may come."