In discussing cases of corrupt action procured by inducements not directly material in character it was pointed out that current moral opinion does not clearly recognise the evil involved. Similarly it may be indicated that many of the less somber _nuances_ of corruption resulting from the selfish interrelations of social groups hardly deserve condemnation, because they are not commonly recognised as deflections from duty. This may be conceded so far as the present conditions of morals is concerned; but under any sharper analysis than is currently employed the element of corruption contained in such actions is manifest. The difficulty of the situation is enhanced by the fact that it is extremely hard to separate and define duty and self-interest in many of the relations of social and individual life. Nevertheless the effort must be made. We must distinguish and define economic interest, family interest, public interest. We have for our guidance the great general principle: “Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.” It is no valid plea in avoidance that it is hard to distinguish the things that are Cæsar’s and the things that are God’s. Rather would it seem to be enjoined upon a robust morality incessantly to search the heart regarding all the details that arise in following the commandment. The most perplexing questions that arise in this interrogation of duty spring from the conflict between fundamental and general moral ideas and the customs of various social groups. It is considered entirely allowable and laudable, for instance, that a father should encourage his son to succeed him in business, even if the business be not his but that of a corporation in which he is simply an official. Many of the means employed to this end—education, travel, apprenticeship, and so on—are beyond reproach. Others involve gross favouritism and disregard of the merits of employees not connected with the family. The most noteworthy point involved in this illustration is that a procedure which passes without question in business and family circles is recognised as reprehensible in politics. From this discrepance in social judgments it follows, however, that the man who has made a success in politics may find it very difficult to see anything but the far-fetched morality of the “unco-guid” in the proposition that he may not provide places in the public service for his relatives and dependents, just as the man who has been successful as a merchant or manufacturer is in the habit of doing in his store or factory.