Regulation of business by the state is an established fact, the causes and origin of which need no further discussion in this place. Once established it is subject to attack and evasion along various lines. Downright fraud is possible, as in the concealment or false weighing of dutiable articles, the publication of false statements regarding the financial condition of fiduciary institutions, the covering up of defects in tenement house building, and so on. Practices of this character are extremely dangerous, however, as they are subject to detection and consequent punishment by the first more than ordinarily inquisitive inspector. Criminal chances are materially improved by the bribery of officials who are thus bound to concealment both by money interest and their own fear of exposure. Vigilant and honest administration of the laws and the infliction of sufficient penalties, particularly if they involve the imprisonment of principals, may be trusted to reduce such practices to a minimum. There are, however, other and more open methods of attack upon the regulation of business by the state. Appeal may be made to the courts in the hope that laws of this character may be declared unconstitutional. Business interests may also seek their repeal or amendment at the hands of the legislature. No one who accepts the fundamental principles of our government can quarrel with either of these two modes of procedure. While doubtless intended to secure the public interest, attempts to regulate industry by the state may in given cases really defeat this end. And the latter likelihood would be increased almost to the point of certainty if legitimate protests from the businesses affected were stifled. On the other hand attempts may be made by business interests to influence courts or legislatures corruptly. Assuming that the honesty of all the departments of government would be proof against such attempts there is still another possibility. A business affected by some form of state regulation may endeavour to call to its aid the influence of party. This final method of procedure may also be conducted in a perfectly legitimate fashion. Public sentiment may be honestly converted to the view that the amendment or repeal of the law, as demanded by the business interest, is also in the interest of the state as a whole. On the other hand the effort may be made, either by large contributions to campaign funds, or by other still more objectionable means, to enlist the support of party regardless of the public welfare. Carrying out these various methods of procedure to their logical conclusion brings us, therefore, face to face with the question which underlies the whole fabric of political corruption, namely how shall our party organisations be supported and financed?