If, however, simultaneity is to be taken in this sense it may be
considered the sole ground of association, for if the images are not
simultaneous there can be no question of association. Simultaneity in
the mind is only the second process, for images are simultaneous in the
mind only because they have occurred simultaneously, existed in the same
space, were similar, etc. Münsterberg,[211] who dealt with the matter
and got important results, points out that all so-called inner
associations, like similarity, contrast, etc., may be reduced to
external association, and all the external associations, even that of
temporal sequence, may be reduced to co-existence, and all
co-existence-associations are psychophysically intelligible. Further:
“The fundamental error of all association processes leading to incorrect
connection of ideas, must be contained in their incompleteness. One idea
was associated with another, the latter with a third, and then we
connect the first with the third ... a thing we should not have done,
since the first, while it co-existed with the second, was also connected
with many others.”
But even this account does not account for certain difficulties, because
some associations are simply set aside, although they should have
occurred. Man is inclined, according to Stricker, to inhibit
associations which are not implied in his “funded” complexes.
If we find direct contradiction with regard to associations, the way out
is not easy. We have then, first, to consider how, by comparatively
remote indirection, to introduce those conditions into the “funded”
complex, which will give rise to the association. But such a
consideration is often a big problem in pedagogy, and we are rarely in
the position of teaching the witness.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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