“In our estimating the intrinsic worth of criminals, we must not fail to take account of this fact, that most honest men do not deprive themselves of any of the pleasures which are the aim of criminals, and that most criminals, in order to escape crime would have had to have rare virtue. Among the legal means of satisfaction offered by society there are those that are easy and agreeable, among others that of drawing the income from capital amassed by one’s parents. There are also difficult and painful ones, which are the lot of those whom pecuniary heredity has not secured against the so-called criminal heredity. In order to share legally in the pleasures of which they are witnesses, those whom we may call disinherited by fortune, must make efforts of which those born to wealth have no idea. This is why, if the disinherited seek a short-cut, we must ask ourselves, before we consider them as monstrous beings, whether under the same circumstances we should be able to keep to the legal path. “The struggle for existence and well-being is regulated by social laws. If these were perfect, each individual could satisfy his wants in an equitable measure, that is to say in the measure of his faculties, his labor, and the service he renders to the community. Crimes would then be diminished in an enormous proportion, but they would not be suppressed, for there would still be inevitable competitions, and the time will probably never come when, on the one hand, each individual will have just the wants that his social worth will permit him to satisfy legally, and, on the other, will have sufficient virtue to renounce the satisfaction of wants, even factitious ones, which he has once contracted without being able to comply with the conditions which the most just law imposes for this satisfaction.” [174] The penal law is one of the means the object of which is combating the illegal satisfaction of wants. Everyone knows, however, that this means does not always attain the end sought. The penal law will, in fact, produce a diminution of criminality only when it shall have brought about profound penal changes,—when punishment shall be no more than the useful and necessary reaction against acts that are harmful to the well-being of the community and to the development of society. It is to be proved that there is, besides the normal, or ordinary, origin of crime, a pathological, or extraordinary, origin. “It is quite superfluous to bring in tendencies atavistically recalled by pathological degeneracy, in order to explain the harmful effects of this degeneracy, and of mental diseases, upon the way in which the degenerate and mentally diseased act. The least functional trouble is enough to alter our sensations, our judgment, our imagination, our deliberations, and consequently, to make us act wrongly.” [175]