It is strange that a writer who considers the pain derived from the unfavourable sentiments of others as so acute that, if sufficiently at command, it would supersede the use of the gallows and the tread-mill, should take no notice of this most important restraint when discussing the question of government. We will attempt to deduce a theory of politics in the mathematical form, in which Mr. Mill delights, from the premises with which he has himself furnished us. Proposition I. Theorem. No rulers will do any thing which may hurt the people. {18}This is the thesis to be maintained: and the following we humbly offer to Mr. Mill, as its syllogistic demonstration. No rulers will do that which produces pain to themselves. But the unfavourable sentiments of the people will give pain to them. Therefore no rulers will do any thing which may excite the unfavourable sentiments of the people. But the unfavourable sentiments of the people are excited by every thing which hurts them. Therefore no rulers will do any thing which may hurt the people. Which was the thing to be proved. Having thus, as we think, not unsuccessfully imitated Mr. Mill’s logic, we do not see why we should not imitate, what is at least equally perfect in its kind, his self-complacency, and proclaim our _Evonka_ in his own words: “The chain of inference, in this case, is close and strong to a most unusual degree.” The fact is, that, when men, in treating of things which cannot be circumscribed by precise definitions, adopt this mode of reasoning, when once they begin to talk of power, happiness, misery, pain, pleasure, motives, objects of desire, as they talk of lines and numbers, there is no end to the contradictions and absurdities into which they fall. There is no proposition so monstrously untrue in morals or politics that we will not undertake to prove it, by something which shall sound like a logical demonstration, from admitted principles.