“_In the grand discovery of modern times, the system of representation, the solution of all the difficulties, both speculative and practical, will perhaps be found. If it cannot, we seem to be forced upon the extraordinary conclusion, that good government is impossible. For, as there is no individual or combination of individuals, except the community itself, who would not have an interest in bad government if intrusted with its powers, and as the community itself is incapable of exercising those powers, and must intrust them to certain individuals, the conclusion is obvious: the community itself must check those individuals; else they will follow their interest, and produce bad government. But how is it the community can cheek? The community can act only when assembled; and when assembled, it is incapable of acting. The community, however, can choose representatives_.” The next question is--How must the representative body be constituted? Mr. Mill lays down two principles, {30}about which, he says, “it is unlikely that there will be any dispute.” “First, The checking body must haye a degree of power sufficient for the business of checking.” “Secondly, It must have an identity of interest with the community. Otherwise, it will make a mischievous use of its power.” The first of these propositions certainly admits of no dispute. As to the second, we shall hereafter take occasion to make some remarks on the sense in which Mr. Mill understands the words “interest of the community.”