Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 2: With a Memoir and Index — John Shaqi
Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 2: With a Memoir and IndexMacaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Baron
Philosophy
Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 2: With a Memoir and Index
Macaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Baron
English literature -- History and criticism; Great Britain -- History
What proposition is there respecting human nature which is absolutely
and universally true? We know of only one: and that is not only true,
but identical; that men always act from self-interest. This truism the
Utilitarians proclaim with as much pride as if it were new, and as much
zeal as if it were important. But in fact, when explained, it means
only that men, if they can, will do as they choose. When we see the
{45}actions of a man we know with certainty what he thinks his interest
to be. But it is impossible to reason with certainty from what _we_ take
to be his interest to his actions. One man goes without a dinner that he
may add a shilling to a hundred thousand pounds: another runs in debt
to give balls and masquerades. One man cuts his father’s throat to get
possession of his old clothes: another hazards his own life to save that
of an enemy. One man volunteers on a forlorn hope: another is drummed
out of a regiment for cowardice. Each of these men has, no doubt, acted
from self-interest. But we gain nothing by knowing this, except the
pleasure, if it be one, of multiplying useless words. In fact, this
principle is just as recondite and just as important as the great truth
that whatever is, is. If a philosopher were always to state facts in
the following form--“There is a shower: but whatever is, is; therefore,
there is a shower,”--his reasoning would be perfectly sound; but we
do not apprehend that it would materially enlarge the circle of human
knowledge. And it is equally idle to attribute any importance to a
proposition which, when interpreted, means only that a man had rather do
what he had rather do.
If the doctrine, that men always act from self-interest, be laid down in
any other sense than this--if the meaning of the word self-interest
be narrowed so as to exclude any one of the motives which may by
possibility act on any human being,--the proposition ceases to be
identical; but at the same time it Rases to be true.
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