Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 3: With a Memoir and IndexMacaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Baron
History
Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays; Vol. 3: With a Memoir and Index
Macaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay, Baron
English literature -- History and criticism; Great Britain -- History
(1) It must be remembered that this was written before the
passing of the reform act.
{20}long oppressed. Any government, however constituted, must respect
their wishes and tremble at their discontents. It is indeed most
desirable that such a people should exercise a direct influence on
the conduct of affairs, and should make their wishes known through
constitutional organs. But some influence, direct or indirect, they will
assuredly possess. Some organ, constitutional or unconstitutional,
they will assuredly find. They will be better governed under a good
constitution than under a bad constitution. But they will be better
governed under the worst constitution than some other nations under the
best. In any general classification of constitutions, the constitution
of Scotland must be reckoned as one of the worst, perhaps as the worst,
in Christian Europe. Yet the Scotch are not ill governed, and the reason
is simply that they will not bear to be ill governed.
In some of the oriental monarchies, in Afghanistan for example,
though there exists nothing which an European publicist would call a
Constitution, the sovereign generally governs in conformity with certain
rules established for the public benefit; and the sanction of those
rules is, that every Afghan approves them, and that every Afghan is a
soldier.
The monarchy of England in the sixteenth century was a monarchy of this
kind. It is called an absolute monarchy, because little respect was paid
by the Tudors to those institutions which we have been accustomed to
consider as the sole checks on the power of the sovereign. A modern
Englishman can hardly understand how the people can have had any real
security for good government under kings who levied benevolences, and
chid the House of Commons as they would have chid a pack of dogs. People
do not sufficiently {21}consider that, though the legal checks were
feeble, the natural checks were strong. There was one great and
effectual limitation on the royal authority, the knowledge that, if the
patience of the nation were severely tried, the nation would put forth
its strength, and that its strength would be found irresistible. If
a large body of Englishmen became thoroughly discontented, instead of
presenting requisitions, holding large meetings, passing resolutions,
signing petitions, forming associations and unions, they rose up;
they took their halberds and their bows; and, if the sovereign was not
sufficiently popular to find among his subjects other halberds and other
bows to oppose to the rebels, nothing remained for him but a repetition
of the horrible scenes of Berkeley and Pomfret. He had no regular army
which could, by its superior arms and its superior skill, overawe
or vanquish the sturdy Commons of his realm, abounding in the native
hardihood of Englishmen, and trained in the simple discipline of the
militia.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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