other tribes, is also a cultural question of great importance, and this
historical phase of the subject psychology is avowedly incompetent to
deal with. Psychology, then, fails throughout to supply us with the
interpretation we want. It is as impotent to reduce to really
interpretative psychological principles the subjective aspect of
cultural phenomena as it is to explain the historical sequence of
events.
It is not necessary to multiply examples to establish the point. It is
clear that cultural phenomena contain elements that cannot be reduced to
psychological principles. The reason for the insufficiency is already
embodied in Tylor’s definition of culture as embracing ‘capabilities and
habits _acquired_ by man as a member of _society_’. The science of
psychology, even in its most modern ramifications of abnormal psychology
and the study of individual variations, does not grapple with _acquired_
mental traits nor with the influence of _society_ on individual thought,
feeling and will. It deals on principle exclusively with _innate_ traits
of the _individual_. Now, whether the sharp separation assumed here
between the innate and the acquired, between individual activity as
determined by uniquely individual potentialities and as determined by
social environment, can be made in practice or not, one thing is clear:
there _are_ phenomena that are acquired and in no sense innate, that are
socially and not individually determined. When a Christian reacts in a
definite way to the perception of a cross, it is clearly not because of
an individual psychic peculiarity, for other Christians react in the
same way. On the other hand, we are not dealing with a general human
trait since the reactions of a Mohammedan or a Buddhist will be quite
different. Innumerable instances of this sort show that individual
thought, feeling and volition are co-determined by social influences. In
so far forth as the potency of these social factors extends we have
culture; in so far forth as knowledge, emotion, and will are neither the
result of natural endowment shared with other members of the species nor
rest on an individual organic basis, we have a thing _sui generis_ that
demands for its investigation a distinct science.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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