Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2Various
History
Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2
Various
World War, 1914-1918
After the battle began, or immediately before the battle, the Germans by
night brought their divisions from the northern part to the point where
the attack took place. They also took several divisions from opposite
the French in the same way and brought them to our front. But it would
have been equally easy for them, while concentrating troops opposite our
front, to manoeuvre them in the same way opposite the French. I am only
referring to that in order to show how exceedingly difficult it is for
Generals on the defensive to decide exactly where, in their judgment,
the attack is coming and where they ought to concentrate their reserves.
General Wilson's Forecast
I may just say a word here. This problem was considered very closely by
the military staff at Versailles, and I think it right, in justice to
them, to point out that after a very close study of the German position
and of the probabilities of the case, they came to the conclusion, and
they stated their conclusion to the military representatives and to the
Ministers in the month of January, or the beginning of February, that
the attack would come south of Arras; that it would be an attack on the
widest front ever yet assailed; that the Germans would accumulate
ninety-five divisions for the purpose of making that attack; that they
would throw the whole of their resources and their strength into
breaking the British line at that point, and that their objective would
be the capture of Amiens and the severance of the British and French
forces.
That was the conclusion which Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial
Staff, came to, and which was submitted at that time, two or three
months ago, and I think that it was one of the most remarkable forecasts
of enemy intentions ever made.
As a matter of fact, the attack was made up, I think, by about
ninety-seven divisions. It was an attack on the widest front that had
ever been engaged. Its object undoubtedly was the capture of Amiens and
the severance of the British and French forces. So that, almost in every
detail, that very remarkable forecast has been verified in the event.
Another remarkable prediction was that it might probably succeed in
penetrating the British line to the extent of half the distance of the
front attacked. They came to the conclusion from a close examination of
the offensives of the war.
Advantage of United Command
There was another advantage. There was, first of all, the advantage
which the Germans had from having the initiative. There was a further
advantage they had, and this undoubtedly was the greatest advantage,
from having a united command opposed to a dual one. The Germans
undoubtedly relied on this to a very large extent for their success.
They owe much of the success of this attack to this.
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