Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2Various
History
Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2
Various
World War, 1914-1918
It was reported to me on good authority that the Kaiser informed ex-King
Constantine: "I shall beat them, for they have no united command." Which
shows that that was what they were relying in the main upon; that,
although their numbers were slightly inferior, they knew the importance
that was to be attached to the fact that they had a perfectly united
command.
And that is an obvious advantage, for if the risks in one particular
part of the line are great, and in another part of the line are great,
but substantially less than in the former, with one command there is no
hesitation in the mind of the Commander in Chief as to which risk he
will make the greatest provision against.
With two separate commands the problem is a different one. It is more
difficult to adjust the balance of risk, and the General is always
naturally inclined to give himself and his army the benefit of any
doubt. That may be because if anything goes wrong there he alone is to
be held responsible to his own countrymen for the safety of his army.
Weather Favored Germans
The enemy had another incidental but, as it turned out, very important
advantage--that of the weather. Exceptional weather favored his designs.
It was both dry and misty. The attack which succeeded was made on that
part of the line where under ordinary Spring conditions the ground would
have been almost impassable.
A wounded officer told a friend of mine today, a General, that under
ordinary conditions no one could walk across the part which was
traversed by the Germans at this time of the year. But it just happened
to be absolutely dry and firm, and they walked across ground which no
one had any right to expect at this time of the year would be in that
condition.
Not only that, but the fact that it was warm increased the mist, and the
Germans were actually in some parts within a few yards of our front line
before any one knew of their approach. It was quite impossible to
observe them. This was a special disadvantage to us, inasmuch as our
scheme of organization in that particular part of the line depended
largely upon the cross-line fire of machine guns and artillery. They
had, therefore, a very special advantage, of which they made the fullest
use.
Closed Up Gap in Armies
With regard to the battle itself, as I have already stated, it will take
some time to ascertain the whole facts. At one time it was undoubtedly
very critical. The enemy broke through between our 3d and 5th Armies,
and there was a serious gap, and the situation was retrieved owing to
the magnificent conduct of our troops. They retired in perfectly good
order, re-establishing the junction between the two armies and
frustrating the enemy's purpose.
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