Another important decision taken by the allied Governments I must also call the attention of the House to. It became more obvious after the battle than ever before that the allied armies were suffering from the fact that they were fighting as two separate armies and had to negotiate support with each other. Valuable time was thus lost. Some of us had been deeply impressed by this peril for some time and had done our best to avert it. But the inherent difficulties to be overcome are tremendous. There are national prejudices, national interests, professional prejudices and traditions. The inherent difficulties of getting two or three separate armies to fight as one are almost insurmountable, and it can only be done if public opinion in all these countries insists upon it as one condition of success. The Versailles conference was an effort at a remedy. How were the Versailles decisions carried out, and the extent to which they were not carried out? This is not the time to inquire. Foch Made Generalissimo I respectfully suggest to the House that no good would come at this stage in discussing this question. But if any one needed conviction as to the wisdom of that policy, this battle must have supplied it. The peril we passed through, by establishing the conviction without challenge, may, I think, be worth the price we paid for it. A few days after the battle commenced there were present not merely the Government, but the commanders in the field. We had not merely Field Marshals but army commanders present. We were so convinced--and the same thing applied to the French--of the importance of more complete strategic unity that they agreed to the appointment of General Foch to the supreme direction of the strategy of all the allied armies on the western front. May I not say just one word about General Foch? It is not merely that he is one of the most brilliant soldiers in Europe, but there is this to be said about him: Foch is the man who, when we were attacked and were in a similar plight at the first battle of Ypres, rushed the French Army there by every conceivable expedient--buses, cabs, lorries, anything he could lay his hands upon. He crowded French divisions through, and undoubtedly helped to win the great battle. There is no doubt about the loyalty and comradeship of General Foch. I have no doubt that this arrangement will be carried out not merely in the letter but in the spirit. But it is the most important decision that has been taken in reference to the coming battle. This strategic unity is, I submit to the House, the fundamental condition of victory. It can only be maintained by complete co-operation between the Governments and the Generals and by something more than that--the unmistakable public opinion behind it. Asks Support for Foch