Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2Various
History
Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2
Various
World War, 1914-1918
Why do I say that? For this reason: A Generalissimo in the ordinary and
full sense of the term may be impracticable. There are three functions
which a General wields--strategical, tactical, and administrative. What
does administrative mean? It means control of organization, the
appointment and dismissal of officers and Generals, and that is a power
which it is difficult or almost impossible to give to Generals of
another country with a national army.
Therefore, in spite of all the arrangements made, unless there be not
merely good-will, but the knowledge that the public of France, Great
Britain, and America will assist in co-ordination and in supporting the
authority in the supreme strategical plans chosen by the Governments,
and in supporting the Governments in any action they may take to assert
their authority, any arrangements made will be futile and mischievous. I
make no apology for dwelling at some length upon this point. I have
always felt that we were losing value and efficiency in the allied
armies through lack of co-ordination and concentration.
We have sustained many disasters already through this, and we shall
encounter more unless this defect in our machinery is put right.
Hitherto, I regret, every effort at amendment led to rather prolonged
and very bitter controversy, and these great inherent difficulties were
themselves accentuated and aggravated. There were difficulties of
carrying out plans and other obstacles, and, what is worse, valuable
time is lost.
I entreat the nation as a whole to stand united for the united control
of the strategical operations of our armies at the front. We know how
much depends upon unity of concentration. We are fighting a very
powerful foe, who, in so far as he has triumphed, has triumphed mainly
because of superior unity and the concentration of his strategic plans.
BRITISH FORCES IN ASIA
There is another matter to which I should like to refer, and it is the
suggestion that our forces have been dissipated on a subsidiary
enterprise. Not a single division was sent from France to the East. With
regard to Italy, had it not been for the fact that there are battalions
of French and British divisions there, the Austrian Army would have been
free to throw the whole of its strength on the western front. If there
were not some there now the Austrian Army would be more powerfully
represented than it is on the western front.
With regard to Saloniki, the only thing the present Government did was
to reduce the forces there by two divisions. In Mesopotamia there is
only one white division in all, and in Egypt and Palestine together
there are only two white divisions, and the rest are either Indians or
mixed with a very small proportion of British troops. I am referring to
infantry divisions.
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