In this connection two schools of opinion--the optimists, who believed in the possibility of an understanding; the pessimists, who considered that war was sooner or later unavoidable. To the former belonged Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Haldane, and most of the members of the Liberal Cabinet, as well as the leading Liberal organs, like The Westminster, The Chronicle, and The (Manchester) Guardian. To the pessimists belonged, primarily, Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who on repeated occasions allowed me to know his opinion, and leading soldiers like Lord Roberts, who preached the necessity for the introduction of compulsory service; also the Northcliffe press, and the important English journalist, Mr. Garvin. During my time in office, however, this party refrained from all attacks, and maintained, both personally and politically, a friendly attitude. But our naval policy and our conduct in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had created among them the belief that some day it would come to war. The first school, exactly as among us in Germany, are now accused of foolishness and short-sightedness, while the second are regarded as true prophets. Prince Lichnowsky goes on to describe the situation during the Balkan war. There were two policies, he says, open to Germany--to act as an impartial mediator and seek a stable settlement in accordance with the wishes of the Balkan peoples, or to conduct a strict Triple Alliance policy. He himself recommended the former, but the Wilhelmstrasse determined on the latter. Austria wished to keep Serbia from the Adriatic; Italy wished to prevent the Greeks from reaching Avlona; Russia supported the Serbs, France supported the Greeks. Germany had no motive whatever for supporting her allies, and thus bringing about a bad settlement, except the desire to consolidate what, in Prince Lichnowsky's opinion, was a palpably worthless alliance--worthless because it was obvious that Italy would break from the alliance in the event of war, while Austria was absolutely dependent on Germany in peace and war without an alliance. The best way to increase Austria's dependence was to cultivate friendly relations between Germany and Russia. The Kaiser, for dynastic reasons, was in favor of the division of Albania between Greece and Serbia, but "when I, in a letter to him, urged this solution, I received from the Chancellor a severe reprimand to the effect that I was supporting Austria's enemies, and should refrain from direct correspondence with the Emperor." Thus Germany decided to take her stand on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors for the sake of the Triple Alliance--a fatal blunder, which Prince Lichnowsky describes as "all the more striking since a sudden Franco-Russian assault--the only hypothesis which could justify the Triple Alliance policy--could, in fact, be ruled out of our calculations." DANGEROUS BALKAN POLICY