It was not only unnecessary, he declares, but dangerous, to pay attention to Austria's wishes, since to look at the Eastern question through Austrian spectacles must lead to a collision with Russia and a world war. Such a policy, moreover, was bound to alienate sympathy among the young, strong, and aspiring communities of the Balkan Peninsula, who were ready to turn to us and to open their markets to us. The opposition between courts and peoples, between the dynastic and the democratic idea of the State, was clearly defined, and, as usual, we stood on the wrong side. * * * In Serbia, against our own economic interests, we supported the Austrian policy of strangulation. We have always ridden horses whose collapse could be foreseen--Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, and William of Wied--and finally we came to grief in Berchtold's stable. Prince Lichnowsky proceeds to describe the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913, and the influential and conciliatory part played there by Sir Edward Grey, who always, he says, found a way out of every apparent deadlock. But we, instead of taking up a position analogous to that of England, invariably espoused the standpoint of Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London; I was his second. My task consisted in supporting his proposals. In Berlin the prudent and experienced Count Szögyény was in control. "Here the casus foederis arises," was his constant refrain, and when I once ventured to question the correctness of this conclusion I was seriously warned for Austrophobia. At all points we accepted and supported the views of Austria and Italy. Sir Edward Grey, on the other hand, practically never sided with Russia or France. Usually, indeed, he took the side of our group, so as not to provide any pretext for conflict. That pretext was supplied later by a dead Archduke. THE GUILT ESTABLISHED Lichnowsky states that a few days after the Serajevo murder of June 28, 1914, he was in Berlin, and from interviews with Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg he found that the latter did not share the Prince's belief that peace might be maintained, and complained of Russian armaments. The memorandum continues: I then went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was representing Herr von Jagow, [Foreign Secretary,] and from him learned that Russia was about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an unmistakable animosity toward Russia, which, he said, was everywhere in our way. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschereschky [the German Ambassador in Vienna] had received a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.