Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2Various
History
Current History: A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, May 1918: Vol. VIII, Part I, No. 2
Various
World War, 1914-1918
Premier Lloyd George in his speech of April 9 [printed on Page 263]
compared the operations in Picardy with the battle of Cambrai. In fact,
the best way to understand what happened in the initial stage of the
great German drive is to remember the sequence of events in the German
attacks on the positions near Cambrai in 1917. At Cambrai there was a
mistaken confidence in the ability to hold the terrain, although German
attacks were expected. When these German assaults came, one was a
surprise, because there had been an unexpected concentration of German
troops; and this attack broke through the defense to such an extent that
it forced the abandonment of other positions, with losses of prisoners
and guns. All these tactical elements were present at the beginning of
the German drive in March, but on a much larger scale, because in this
case the German assaults were made on a front of some fifty miles.
The difficult problem for the Allies, in preparing to defend their long
front against the expected German offensive, was to provide against the
well-known German tactics of assembling superior numbers at the place of
battle. In this war the German "massed attacks" have not been so much a
matter of formation as of delivering streams of troops at the chosen
point of contact to overwhelm their opponents with superior numbers at
that point. These German tactics were again used in the attacks, begun
on March 21, against the British front from southeast of Arras as far as
La Fère.
FIFTH ARMY'S DISASTER
Here were in position the 3d British Army (General Byng) in the section
toward Arras, and, on the right to the south, the 5th British Army
(General Gough) in the region west of St. Quentin. On March 21 there was
a tremendous bombardment followed by infantry attacks all along the
line, which resulted in winning many first-line positions. This was
nothing more than had been expected, and provision had been made against
it; but, unfortunately, as at Cambrai, the Germans had been enabled to
make an unexpected concentration of superior numbers against positions
of the 5th British Army.[1] The assault of this overwhelming force broke
through the British lines, even to the extent of involving engineers and
laborers behind the lines, as at Cambrai, with the same disastrous
results. This breakdown of the defense forced a retreat from the British
positions far different from the retirement that had been planned--and
it brought about the withdrawal of the whole 5th Army, resulting in what
the British Premier called "crippling one of our great armies."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account