The former Foreign Minister refuses to adopt the Pan-German view that "England laid all the mines which caused the war." On the contrary, he bears witness with former Ambassador Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey's "love of peace and his serious wish to reach an agreement with us." He says that it is true that Sir Edward could have prevented war, but he is careful not to indicate how. Presumably he means he could have done it by following Germany's example and treating England's engagements as "scraps of paper." He agrees that the war was not popular with the British people, and that Belgium had to serve as a battlecry. Germany, on the other hand, had to maintain her prestige. It had been damaged by her political defeat in Morocco. A fresh diminution of it would have been, he remarks, "intolerable for our position in Europe and in the world." In one point of fact he corrects Prince Lichnowsky. He denies that he himself visited Vienna at any time between the Spring of 1913 and the outbreak of the war. He confirms, as far as he remembers, all the expressions attributed to him by Lichnowsky. His only reference to the Potsdam Council of July 5, 1914, (when, it is asserted, the Teuton leaders made the final decision for war,) is not a denial that the meeting took place, but a single sentence: "On July 5 I was absent from Berlin." In regard to Lichnowsky's main charges, Herr von Jagow talks of "unheard-of" assertions and "inaccuracies and perversions," but he does not bring forward any fresh arguments to meet the charges, and merely refers to the publications of the German Government concerning the conversations which took place in June, 1914, between the Kaiser and Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Herr von Jagow says: At Konopischt no plan was laid down (festgelegt) for an active policy against Serbia. Archduke Francis Ferdinand was not at all an advocate of a policy leading to war, although he was often reckoned as such. During the London conference he advised moderation and avoidance of war. Herr van Jagow here avoids the issue raised by Lichnowsky, who did not say that a definite scheme was arranged at Konopischt, but that the indication was, not that Archduke Francis Ferdinand was in favor of war, but that his death was a positive relief to the advocates of war. In the course of his statement Herr von Jagow, who remained Foreign Secretary until late in 1916, says: When I was appointed State Secretary in January, 1913, it seemed to me that a German-English rapprochement was desirable, and an understanding upon those points where our interests touched and sometimes even crossed, and this I deemed feasible. At least, it was my intention to work on this. With regard to the Bagdad question Herr von Jagow says: