If England insisted upon excluding us from Mesopotamia, it appeared to me that a conflict would be avoided with difficulty. We were met in a conciliatory manner by the English Government, and an agreement had almost been reached just previous to the outbreak of the world war. He meets Lichnowsky's assertion that Germany drove Russia "into the arms of France and England by our Oriental and Balkan policy" with the contention that the Pan-Slavism which governed Russian politics was directly anti-German. Upon the London conference on Algeciras he says: We no more desired war on Albania's account than did Sir Edward Grey. That is why, in spite of our former experiences at Algeciras, we consented to the conference. The merit of a conciliatory attitude at the conference must not be denied to Sir Edward Grey, but it is going a little too far to say that he in nowise took up his stand on the side of the Entente. He certainly often urged St. Petersburg to give way, and found principles of accord (Einigungs Formeln) suitable to this end. But outwardly he represented the Entente, as he could no more leave his associates in the lurch than could we. Nor did he wish to do so. On the other hand, the assertion that we adopted without exception the standpoint prescribed for us by Vienna is absolutely untrue. We played, as England did, a conciliatory rôle, and urged moderation upon Vienna far more than Lichnowsky seems to be aware of, or at any rate admits. Vienna thereupon made a variety of the most far-reaching concessions, Dibra and Djakowa. ENGLAND EXONERATED Mentioning the Serajevo murders as the climax of the continued Russian provocations against Austria, von Jagow says: The prestige and existence of the Danube monarchy were at stake. We could not agree to the English proposal concerning a conference of Ministers, as it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat for us. I do not intend to adopt the theory now widespread among us that England was the originator of all the intrigues leading to the war. On the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and his genuine desire to arrive at an understanding with us, but he had allowed himself to become too hopelessly entangled in the network of Franco-Russian policy. He could find no way out, and therefore failed to do that which had been in his power to prevent the world war. War was not popular among the English people, therefore Belgium had to serve as a battle cry. At the end of his observations von Jagow restates his policy as follows: