At 4:15 there was an attack "simultaneously"[4] by British and German destroyers which resulted in a lively fight, but no damage to any of the capital ships. Yet the possibilities of such torpedo attacks were so evident, here and later in the battle, that the destroyer at once attained a greater value as an auxiliary of the battleship. It should also be noted that German submarines were reported present at this stage, but they accomplished nothing against the screened fighting ships. A British airplane had been sent up from a mother ship just before the engagement, though Admiral Beatty reports that it was forced to fly low on account of the clouds, and had a hard task "to identify four enemy light cruisers." There was apparently no chance of a wide observation that would have warned Admiral Beatty of the approaching German High Seas Fleet. In this short hour were concentrated many new problems of naval warfare. The advancing German High Seas Fleet was reported at 4:38 by a light cruiser, and sighted at 4:42 by the British battle cruisers. A few minutes later Vice Admiral Beatty's ships turned right about (180 degrees) in succession. The German battle cruisers also turned to a northwesterly course, closely followed up by the van of the German High Seas Fleet, and the action was continued on this course. The report of Admiral Beatty and his conduct in this part of the action show that he had not suspected the presence of the German High Seas Fleet, but the lavish criticism of his turn in succession is without reason. In the first place, his ships met no disaster at the turn, and the manoeuvre is absolutely justified by the fact that it brought the four Queen Elizabeth battleships into position to fight a rearguard action against the greatly strengthened enemy. Any other disposition of Admiral Beatty's command would have been a mistake. It also follows that, against the turn made in this way, it would have been an error for Vice Admiral Hipper to try for a capping position, with the object of smothering Admiral Beatty's cruisers in detail at their pivoting point. Such an attempt would have exposed his own battle cruisers to the 15-inch guns of the approaching dreadnoughts of Admiral Evan-Thomas's squadron. Admiral Hipper's conduct in turning to the northwest ahead of the van of the German High Seas Fleet seems the best thing he could have done at the time. The leading German battleships, which were of the König class, fell into line, closely following Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, and the battle was continued at 14,000 yards on a northwest course.