Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his rôle of "honest broker" he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good-will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view, we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second. GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was "casus foederis," and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war--which was afterward brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask "our allies" to make concessions. Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives. AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia. As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question--the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question--was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.