The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy. His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat--tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France. I once said: "The feeling in Russia is very anti-German." He replied: "There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian." It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests. PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY [The next passages, which had formerly been suppressed by the Swedish Government, appeared in the Politiken of Stockholm on March 26:] At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and savoir faire he could always win sympathy. Next to him a great rôle was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention. M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold--and naturally we with him--was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers. AUSTRIA'S PRESTIGE INJURED