"The Ambassador's speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread also among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the 'most important things,' in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising of our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard. Defense of Archduke "It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed. "At Knopischt, on the occasion of the visit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Archduke heir apparent, no plan of an active policy against Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the champion of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken. During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of war. "Prince Lichnowsky's 'optimism' was hardly justified, as he has probably convinced himself since through the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the Under Secretary of State was well grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count Pourtalès that 'Russia would not move under any circumstances,' had not thought of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports. Blame for Russia