"That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant provocations stirred up by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which reached their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio of the war in general, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations, (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years, were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion. "I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand--it was a matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I also wrote that 'Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German' and that we must 'just risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there would probably be some 'bluster'; that 'the more firmly we stood by Austria the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.