could conceive of "self-adaptation" alone producing all such innumerable and diversified adjustments only after seeing, with Cardinal Newman, an angel in every flower. Yet Mr. Henslow somewhat vehemently repudiates any association between his theory and that of teleology. [11] _Floral Structures_ (Internat. Sc. Ser. lxiv. 1888): _The Making of Flowers_ (Romance of Science Ser. 1891); and Linn. Soc. Papers 1893-4. On the whole, then, I regard all the works which are here classed together (those by Cope, Geddes, and Henslow), as resembling one another both in their merits and defects. Their common merits lie in their erudition and much of their criticism, while their common defects consist on the one hand in not sufficiently distinguishing between mere statements and real explanations of facts, and, on the other, in not perceiving that the theories severally suggested as substitutes for that of natural selection, even if they be granted true, could be accepted only as co-operative factors, and by no stretch of logic as substitutes. * * * * * Turning now to Mr. Wallace's work on _Darwinism_, we have to notice, in the first place, that its doctrine differs from "Darwinism" in regard to the important dogma which it is the leading purpose of that work to sustain--namely, that "the law of utility" is, to all intents and purposes, universal, with the result that natural selection is virtually the only cause of organic evolution. I say "to all intents and purposes," or "virtually," because Mr. Wallace does not expressly maintain the abstract impossibility of laws and causes other than those of utility and natural selection; indeed, at the end of his treatise, he quotes with approval Darwin's judgement, that "natural selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive means of modification." Nevertheless, as he nowhere recognizes any other law or cause of adaptive evolution[12], he practically concludes that, on inductive or empirical grounds, there _is_ no such other law or cause to be entertained--until we come to the particular case of the human mind. But even in making this one particular exception--or in representing that some other law than that of utility, and some other cause than that of natural selection, must have been concerned in evolving the mind of man--he is not approximating his system to that of Darwin. On the contrary, he is but increasing the divergence, for, of course, it was Darwin's view that no such exception could be legitimately drawn with respect to this particular instance. And if, as I understand must be the case, his expressed agreement with Darwin touching natural selection not being the only cause of adaptive evolution has reference to this point, the quotation is singularly inapt.