Darwin, and After Darwin, Volume 2 of 3: Post-Darwinian Questions: Heredity and UtilityRomanes, George John
Science
Darwin, and After Darwin, Volume 2 of 3: Post-Darwinian Questions: Heredity and Utility
Romanes, George John
Evolution (Biology); Heredity
So much for the general principle of selective value as applied to this
particular case. And similarly, of course, we might here repeat the
application of all the other general principles, which have just been
applied in the two preceding cases. But it is only one of these other
general principles which I desire in the present case specially to
consider, for the purpose of considering more closely than hitherto the
difficulty which this principle presents to ultra-Darwinian theory.
The difficulty to which I allude is that of understanding how all the
stages in the _development_ of a reflex action can have been due to
natural selection, seeing that, before the reflex mechanism has been
sufficiently elaborated to perform its function, it cannot have
presented any degree of utility. Now the particular force of the present
example, the action of scratching--as also of the one to
follow--consists in the fact that it is a case where a reflex action is
not yet completely organized. It appears to be only in course of
construction, so that it is neither invariably present, nor, when it is
present, is it ever fully adapted to the performance of its function.
That it is not invariably present (when the brain is so) may be proved
by trying the simple experiment on a number of puppies--and also of
full-grown dogs. Again, that even when it is present it is far from
being fully adapted to the performance of its function, may be proved by
observing that only in rare instances does the scratching leg succeed in
scratching the place which is being irritated. The movements are made
more or less at random, and as often as not the foot fails to touch the
body at any place at all. Hence, although we have a "prophecy" of a
reflex action well designed for the discharge of a particular function,
at present the machinery is not sufficiently perfected for the adequate
discharge of that function. In this important respect it differs from
the otherwise closely analogous reflex action of the frog, whereby the
foot of the hind leg is enabled to localize with precision a seat of
irritation on the side of the body. But this beautiful mechanism in the
frog cannot have sprung into existence ready formed at any historical
moment in the past history of the phyla. It must have been the subject
of a more or less prolonged evolution, in some stage of which it must
presumably have resembled the now nascent scratching reflex of the dog,
in making merely abortive attempts at localizing the seat of
irritation--supposing, of course, that some physiologist had been there
to try the experiment by first removing the brain. Now, even if one
could imagine it to be, either in the frog or in the dog, a matter of
selective importance that so exceedingly refined a mechanism should have
been developed for the sole purpose of inhibiting the bites of
parasites--which in every normal animal would certainly be discharged by
an _intentional_ performance of the movements in question,--even if, in
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