Darwin, and After Darwin, Volumes 1 and 3: An Exposition of the Darwinian Theory and a Discussion of Post-Darwinian QuestionsRomanes, George John
Science
Darwin, and After Darwin, Volumes 1 and 3: An Exposition of the Darwinian Theory and a Discussion of Post-Darwinian Questions
Romanes, George John
Evolution (Biology); Heredity
statement.
In his most recent work Mr. Wallace advances an interesting hypothesis
to the effect that differences of colour between allied species, which
are apparently too slight to serve any other purpose, may act as
"recognition marks," whereby the opposite sexes are enabled at once to
distinguish between members of their own and of closely resembling
species. Of course this hypothesis can only apply to the higher animals;
but the point here is that, supposing it to hold for them, Mr. Wallace
proceeds to argue thus:--Recognition marks "have in all probability been
acquired in the process of differentiation for the purpose of checking
the intercrossing of allied forms," because "one of the first needs of a
new species would be to keep separate from its nearest allies, and this
could be more readily done by some easily seen external mark[32]."
Now, it is clearly not so much as logically possible that these
recognition-marks (supposing them to be such) can have been acquired
by natural selection, "for the purpose of checking intercrossing of
allied forms." For the theory of natural selection, from its own
essential nature as a theory, is logically exclusive of the supposition
that survival of the fittest ever provides changes in anticipation of
future uses. Or, otherwise stated, it involves a contradiction of the
theory itself to say that the colour-changes in question were originated
by natural selection, in order to meet "one of the _first_ needs of a
_new_ species," or for the purpose of _subsequently_ preventing
intercrossing with allied forms. If it had been said that these
colour-differentiations were originated by some cause other than natural
selection (or, if by natural selection, still with regard to some
_previous_, instead of _prophetic_, "purpose"), and, when so "acquired,"
_then_ began to serve the "purpose" assigned, the argument would not
have involved the fallacy which we are now considering. But, as it
stands, the argument reverts to the teleology of pre-Darwinian days--or
the hypothesis of a "purpose" in the literal sense which sees the end
from the beginning, instead of a "purpose" in the metaphorical sense of
an adaptation that is evolved by the very modifications which subserve
it[33].
[32] _Darwinism_, pp. 218 and 227.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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