[5] July 16, 1916. [6] _La Grande Armée de 1813_. Paris, 1871. [7] Malachowski. _Scharfe Taktik und Revuetaktik_. Berlin, 1902. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. [8] _Militärische Schriften Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen_. I., No. 336ff. Bemerkung zu einer Denkschrift Boyens. [9] _Ueber Verantwortlichkeit im Kriege_. [10] Wolfgang Foerster. _Prinz Friedrich Karl von Preussen. Denkwürdigkeiten aus seinem Leben_. I., p. 170. Stuttgart und Leipzig, 1910. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. [11] _Ibidem_, i., p. 219. [12] Reisner v. Lichtenstern. _Schiessausbildung und Feuer der Infanterie im Gefecht_. Berlin, 1895. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. [13] See p. 164. [14] Freytag-Loringhoven. _Die Grundbedingungen kriegerischen Enfolges_. 1914. E. S. Mittler und Sohn. (The War has completely justified this view.) [15] _Imperial Germany_, pp. 154-6. London, Cassell & Co., Ltd. [_Deutsche Politik_, 1916, pp. 163-4.] [16] Heinrich v. Treitschke, _Politics_, vol. ii., p. 299-300. London, Constable & Co. Ltd. New York, The Macmillan Company. [_Politik_, II., p. 275.] [17] Gourgaud. _Ste. Hélène_, i. [18] Quoted from Jähns, _Das französische Heer von der grossen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart_. Leipzig, 1873. [19] Heinrich von Treitschke. _Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert_. Vol. ii., p. 10. [20] _Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19 Jahrhundert_, 3d edn., p. 134. Berlin, Georg Bondi. 1913. [21] _General-Prinzipien vom Kriege. Von denen Talents, welche ein General haben muss_. Taysen, Friedrich der Grosse. Militärische Schriften, p. 106. [22] Gourgaud, Ste. Hélène, ii., p. 416. [23] _Theorie des grossen Krieges_. VI STILL READY FOR WAR The war-readiness of Germany had been very much increased by the votings of the last great Army Bills, together with the carrying out of the programme of naval construction. And yet we have been obliged to organise new formations on a very large scale, and to develop our armaments industry to an extent which had never been anticipated. The levy on capital of a thousand million marks, measured on the scale of the costs of the War, now no longer seems to us the enormous sacrifice which caused doubts as to whether it could be demanded of the German people. The War has, on the one hand, revealed to us the full financial strength of Germany; but, on the other hand, it has proved that additional expenditure on the army at the right time would have been profitable. We should then have saved in this War not only milliards of marks, but in all probability we should have had to offer up a far less considerable sacrifice of men. In view of the central position of the Fatherland, larger expenditure on the land-army, in addition to the necessary expenditure on the fleet, was absolutely essential. The demands which in this connection were put before the Reichstag were but a feeble minimum of what was really desirable, as the World War has proved.