Deductions from the World WarFreytag-Loringhoven, Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann, Freiherr von
History
Deductions from the World War
Freytag-Loringhoven, Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann, Freiherr von
Germany. Heer; War; World War, 1914-1918
In order to achieve this, it would be advisable that these
institutions should be established in university towns, so that the
services of the professors who would there be available might be
turned to account. This world economic War has revealed the
necessity that officers should make themselves so far familiar with
political, constitutional, economic, and social questions as to
enable them to form an independent judgment about these subjects.
The character of the whole modern life of our State makes it
desirable that the officer should keep himself in touch with these
questions, though he need not for that reason become a politician.
Frederick the Great, even in his day, wrote: "I expect above all that
a general shall be an honest man and a good citizen of the State;
without these qualities, all his ability and all his skill in war
will be rather harmful than profitable."[21] By this the King
implies that military science and political science are closely
related. We must contrive to kindle in the officer, while he is
still young, an interest in this relation, so that he may be capable,
in the training of his men, of enlightening them from time to time
upon questions of civic and economic life. Short, well-written
primers might be of great value here.
That "untiring application" which King Frederick demanded from his
officers and which has also always been demanded of us, must be
insisted on more than ever after the War. Its intellectual side is
by no means the least important. The training of the mind by
assiduous study is a necessity not only for the officers of the
General Staff, but also for those who wish to occupy with advantage
any high position in the army. We have no use for officers with a
scholastic training, but we do need officers with well-trained minds.
Napoleon felt keenly the lack of such, and, even at St. Helena, he
placed the Austrian General Staff above his own.[22] As long as
theory does not set itself--to use the words of Clausewitz--"in
opposition to intelligence," it can only be useful, for it is then no
longer theory in the vulgar sense. Even the talent of the most
famous representatives of the military art--Frederick the Great,
Napoleon, and Moltke--had a theoretical foundation, but this
foundation consisted only in education of the mind, which had been
developed and enlarged as a result of their own experience of life
and of war. In any case, the important thing can never be the
encouragement of purely theoretical knowledge in the army, but rather
the transforming of knowledge into practice. Willisen[23] has said
justly: "It is always a long step from knowledge to ability to act,
but none the less it is a step from knowledge and not from ignorance."
[1] _Bemerkungen über den Einfluss der verbesserten Feuerwaffen_.
[2] _On War_, i., 187. [_Vom Kriege, III. B._, 6 Kap.]
[3] Reisner v. Lichtenstern. _Die Macht der Vorstellung im Kriege_.
Berlin, 1902.
[4] _Echo de Paris_, November 23, 1915.
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