To be sure, modern times had already witnessed one great economic war. The American Civil War of the sixties of last century arose out of the economic antagonism between the trading and industrial States of the North and the cotton-growing States of the South of the Union. In the latter, cultivation by the aid of slaves formed the basis of the industry, and to this extent the slave question was a factor in the dispute. It was not, however, until later that the demand for the abolition of slavery found wide expression in the North and was utilised as a welcome means of stirring up feeling against the South. The real points at issue were that the Northern States wanted high protective duties, while the Southern States wanted to facilitate export, and that the Northern States had a special interest in utilising the customs revenues for investments which should above all be of advantage to their trade, but which were a matter of indifference to the South. The American War of Secession, like everything else American at that time, attracted little attention with us. Germany was still only a geographical conception; there could be no question of a world-policy for its component States. Moreover, our own wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, claimed all our attention. Yet, different as were the cause, the development, and the other conditions of the American Civil War compared with the present World War, the economic factors which in each case found expression have engendered more than one similar phenomenon. The Northern States endeavoured at the outset, by the aid of their imposing fleet, to cut off the Southern States, which had no battle-fleet worth mentioning, from their sea-borne supplies, and, also, on land, from the Mississippi and the corn-growing States of the South-West, and thus paralyse them economically. The valour of the Southern troops, who were far inferior numerically, as well as of their generals, and, above all, the distinguished leadership of Lee, for four years rendered impossible the accomplishment of this so-called "Anaconda plan," until the Southern States finally succumbed to the blockade.