§ 246. The quantity of a proposition is determined by the quantity in
extension of its subject.
§ 247. Very often the matter of an indefinite proposition is such as
clearly to indicate to us its quantity. When, for instance, we say
'Metals are elements,' we are understood to be referring to all
metals; and the same thing holds true of scientific statements in
general. Formal logic, however, cannot take account of the matter of
propositions; and is therefore obliged to set down all indefinite
propositions as particular, since it is not evident from the form that
they are universal.
§ 248. Particular propositions, therefore, are sub-divided into such
as are Indefinite and such as are Particular, in the strict sense of
the term.
§ 249. We must now examine the sub-division of universal propositions
into Singular and General.
§ 250. A Singular proposition is one which has a singular term for its
subject, e.g. 'Virtue is beautiful.'
§ 251. A General proposition is one which has for its subject a common
term taken in its whole extent.
§ 252. Now when we say 'John is a man' or 'This table is oblong,' the
proposition is quite as universal, in the sense of the predicate
applying to the whole of the subject, as when we say 'All men are
mortal.' For since a singular term applies only to one thing, we
cannot avoid using it in its whole extent, if we use it at all.
§ 253. The most usual signs of generality in a proposition are the
words 'all,' 'every,' 'each,' in affirmative, and the words 'no,'
'none,' 'not one,' &c. in negative propositions.
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