In the opinion of Kuhlmann these cases of disturbed emotions and will which shade off into different forms of insanity should not be classed as feeble-minded at all, although he recognizes that they are commonly placed in this group. He regards them as an intermediate class between the feeble-minded and the insane. He says: “They readily fail in the social test for feeble-mindedness and because of the absence of definite symptoms of insanity are often classed as feeble-minded. In the opinion of the present writer they should not be so classed, because they require a different kind of care and treatment, and have a different kind of capacity for usefulness” (_140_). So long as this group of what we shall term “conative cases” is discriminated from the intellectually deficient it matters less whether they be regarded as a sub-group of the feeble-minded or as a co-ordinate class. In grouping them with the feeble-minded we have followed the customary classification. An estimate of the size of this group will be considered later in Chapter III. C. DOUBTFUL INTELLECTS ACCOMPANIED BY DELINQUENCY PRESUMED DEFICIENT. Conative forms of feeble-mindedness are perhaps the most serious types in the field of delinquency. They are the troublesome portion of the borderland group of deficient delinquents about which there is so much concern. It is important to remember that it is just among these cases that the test judgment is least certain. In this dilemma one principle seems to be sound enough psychologically to be likely to meet with acceptance. I should state this principle as follows: _A borderline case which has also shown serious and repeated delinquency should be classed as feeble-minded, the combination of doubtful intellect and repeated delinquency making him socially unfit._ This will relieve the practical situation temporarily until tests are perfected which will detect those whose feebleness is specialized in those phases of volition centering around the instinctive passions, control, balance, interest and endurance. The principle recognizes that mental weakness is sometimes emphasized in the volitional processes of the mind.